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ABSTRACT 
Historical Discourse’s Truth Matrix was first posited by Michel Foucault 
to describe the emergence of a discourse of historical events subsequent 
to the cessation of war and established by the most powerful arbiters of 
those events. This paper adapts the implements of Foucault’s toolbox to 
conceptualise the dimensions of subjectivity that historical events pass 
through from the original event to their subsequent depictions in 
historical writing or other media. The Corpus of Irish Historical 
Narratives (COIHN) is a one-million-word representative corpus of oral-
history witness testimonies taken from the Bureau of Military History 
Archive (BMH) which depict the events surrounding the Irish struggle 
for independence from the lead up to the 1916 rising to the signing of the 
Anglo-Irish treaty in 1921. The archive provides a rich source of both 
historical, social and cultural data and has been the source of many 
publications pertaining to events of this pivotal time in Irish history. In 
ceding some agency to the data itself, this study takes a hybrid corpus-
driven and corpus-based approach to the analysis of epistemic modality 
in these statements through hedged expressions using mental process 
verbs and so offers a framework for the analysis of a core dimension of 
historical discourse’s truth matrix. The notion of ‘paradoxical authority’ 
is proposed, stating that the authority of a witness is boosted rather than 
mitigated by expressing weak commitment to the truth of a proposition. 
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CHRISTOPHER FITZGERALD 
UNIVERSITY OF LIMERICK 
1.1 1. Historical discourse’s truth matrix 
Historical witness testimonies have previously been used adjacent to historical research 
to explore sociological issues such as identity construction (Britt, 2018) and community 
(Schiffrin, 2009). In this study, such testimonies are seen as a profitable platform to 
explore how truth is linguistically constructed as they attempt to accurately portray his-
torical events through narratives influenced by, in this case, military discourse (Achugar, 
2008), the passage of time (Cubitt, 2013) and master narratives (Hendry, 2009). In Witt-
gensteinian (1921) terms, language can never completely establish the complexity of 
reality, instead, we are compelled to provide approximations of reality with the linguistic 
devices available to us through the limited structural medium of narrative. An added 
dimension to the limitations of language when attempting to reconstruct an experience 
is the ‘memory phenomenon’ which influences both historical memory and writing (Hut-
ton, 2016), pertaining to this study as the witness statements analysed were delivered up 
to three decades after the events described taking place. 
A third dimension to be considered when establishing the extent to which such state-
ments may be thought of as accurate portrayals of events is the subjective prism through 
which they were originally witnessed, compounded by the various events and external 
influences which are likely to taint that perspective in the intervening time between the 
events taking place and their being recounted, in conjunction with concerns related to 
the presentation of self to the broader community of participants, as described by 
Goffman (1978). We thus have a multi-layered system of dimensions which are likely 
to impact the interpretation of historical events. This complex matrix of dimensions is 
the matter through which the statements emerge from the experience of the witnesses. 
Added to this are the particular motivations of the organisation, in this case the Bureau 
of Military History (BHM), which established the archive with its own external influ-
ences and institutional memory (Achugar, 2008), and multiple tendentious allegiances 
stemming from regimes of truth (Foucault, 1975). 
The process of transcription adds further discrepancies through the process of tran-
sitioning from spoken to written narrative modes (Portelli, 1997), in addition to histori-
ographers then taking these statements and often presenting them as elements of a 
broader narrative which is influenced by their biases and background, the ‘historian’s 
history’ as Nietzsche would have it (in Foucault, 1978), which is then presented for pub-
lic consumption as a depiction of history through a subjective lens, informed by individ-
ual identities and experiences. These dimensions are summarised in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: Dimensions of historical discourse's truth matrix 
This study focuses on the dimensions above which can be investigated through the uti-
lisation of corpus tools to assess the extent to which truth is supported and committed to 
in such texts through the usage of devices which are proxies for evidence and epistemic 
modality (Eder, 2020). As Cubitt (2013, p. 208) states, ‘The memory of an event or a 
historical experience begins with the event or experience itself.’ This reality is the truest 
form of the event. Subsequent to that event exists its ‘afterlife’, where multiple iterations 
add dimensions of subjectivity, creating a ‘truth vulnerability’ (Rath et al., 2019) 
whereby reality is distanced from the narrative, these dimensions produce historical dis-
course’s truth matrix. Inherent in each iteration is an added layer of subjectivity that is a 
by-product of narrative (Henwood et al., 2011), thus the preliminary interpretation of 
the initial event grows in import as the dominant influence on the transition from reality 
to history (Carr, 2016). In an archive of witness testimonies such as that investigated 
here, where multiple witnesses give their versions of the same events, ‘competing nar-
ratives’ (Golubeva, 2010) emerge that may be in conflict with each other, further blurring 
the possibility of a true depiction. A return to the closest proximal interpretation of the 
event can provide a means of reclaiming the historicity of those events (Margolis, 2016), 
to attempt to penetrate the dimensions of historical discourse’s truth matrix. In the case 
of historical archives such as that investigated in this study, this entails accessing testi-
monies of those who witnessed and took part in the historical events. 
1.2 2. The Bureau of Military History 
The BMH, established in 1947 by the then Minister of Defence was an ambitious project 
of national importance which sought to accumulate as much information as possible 
about the events surrounding the Irish independence movement from witnesses and par-
ticipants of those events (Doyle et al., 2002). Over the subsequent ten years, 1,773 wit-
ness statements as well as letters, photographs and press cuttings were collected by the 
bureau’s staff, which was composed of senior army personnel as well as civilians. The 
staff were given training and strict instructions about how to gain an objective and ac-
curate account from witnesses as well as a chronological account of the historical events 
that were to be the subjects of the statements (Ryan, 2014). Specific instructions were 
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delivered to investigating officers pertaining to the taking of evidence, the disclosure of 
information, communication to the press, accuracy and literary style of witness state-
ments. Guides were given as to how to avoid the pitfalls that are commonly cited criti-
cisms of oral history testimonies; subjectivity and the influence of other sources such as 
the media, collective memory and failing memory, as is evidenced in the following in-
struction from the bureau’s records: 
In listening to and recording his story you should keep an open mind. Your aim at all 
times must be to get from him an objective factual record of events based on his own 
experiences. To that end he should be tactfully questioned on every point, to ensure that 
what he tells is, in fact, what he knows and not something which he has imagined, read 
or heard from someone else. Failing memory will sometimes impart an air of 
unreliability to what may be a genuine story, and the utmost care must be exercised in 
such cases. (File S. 851, 10 May 1948; see TheEasterRising.eu [n.d.]) 
There is no evidence of the questions asked by investigating officers or of the particular 
input that they had in each interview. Few of the statements were recorded using audio, 
oral statements were most often put on record through the collation of ‘copious notes’ 
(Ferriter, 2003). Hence, many of the statements lack the discursive features that would 
have existed when the witnesses were delivering their statements, but still retain ele-
ments of spoken discourse given that, ‘The vast majority of witness statements were 
derived from some kind of interview process, and they bear all the hallmarks of oral 
testimony (Morrison 2009, p. 7).’ Ryan comments further on the linguistic style of the 
statements: 
The great majority of the statements are narrative in style, but even within these limits, 
they are extraordinarily varied. Some witnesses are self-consciously reticent, for 
example saying ‘we’ when the clearly mean ‘I’; others warm to their subject, becoming 
quite flowery in their language. The spare, laconic style of many of the female 
witnesses, when describing intensely emotional events, was typical of the Anglo-Irish 
Edwardians still surviving in the 1940s. (Ryan 2014, p. 30) 
In addition to those cited above, there were other issues which investigating officers had 
to consider, including, as Gkotzaridis (2006, p. 111) points out, ‘loyalty to comrades, 
fear of self-contradiction, and a too happy acceptance of the myth of a happy and suc-
cessful resolution.’ To increase the integrity of the operation, an advisory committee 
composed of academics and scholars of Irish history was put in place to assist the bu-
reau’s staff if such support was needed. Witnesses were identified and attracted to the 
project through a publicity campaign that included the circulation of an information leaf-
let, a radio appeal by the Minister for Defence and notices in the national press, but the 
majority of participants were found through applications to the Military Service Pension 
scheme. Having completed the lengthy and arduous collation of statements, for reasons 
of protecting those involved in the project and those who participated in the events de-
picted in the testimonies, the archive remained largely inaccessible to the public for 
much of the subsequent six decades. After much debate and solicitation, the archive was 
finally made publicly available in 2003. The reasons (legitimate and otherwise) for the 
prolonged holding of these records are many and complex and set out by O’Brien (2004). 
Members of the public can now access the files in printed form from the military bar-
racks in Dublin or in digital form online at www.militaryarchives.ie.  This digitisation 
has been praised by historians, with Horne and Madigan (2013) citing it as a model of 
how to democratise history. 
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One of the key reasons why this archive is seen by historians such as McGarry (2013, 
p. 47) as ‘the most important source to date for understanding the Irish Revolution,’ is 
its inclusion of those who were rarely given the opportunity to contribute their voices to 
public record, the everyday citizens who, as McGarry states, ‘rarely recorded their 
thoughts in letters, diaries or memoirs’ (2013, p. 47). The inclusion of this breadth of 
participants, as well as the indulgence provided some participants to catalogue their own 
life events and lifestyles extraneous to historical events, lends the archive to the curiosity 
of those not just interested in the historical events for which it was the remit of the bureau 
to document, but to a broader field of scholarship and attention as well as refocusing 
interest on the events which they depict, as Crowley et al. (2017, p. 869) suggest, ‘the 
sheer volume and detail of the BMH material permitted — indeed, required — new 
questions to be asked’. Historians who use the archive tend to provide a caveat related 
to its questionable legitimacy, which is a typical concern held by historians towards wit-
ness testimonies, such as Ó Ruairc (2014, p. 113), ‘As these statements were collected 
between twenty to thirty-five years after the events described they must be treated with 
caution since they may contain inaccuracies, contradictory evidence or personal bias.’ 
Morrison (2016) likewise acknowledges this, but is also keen to highlight the accuracy 
which some of the statements contribute to documentation of events that was previously 
missing, stating that, though the previously stated detractions are present, ‘this charac-
teristic should not be exaggerated (p. 878).’ 
Given the passage of time since both the events depicted taking place and the deliv-
ery of the testimonies compounded by the further delay in their public release, there 
exists little opportunity to re-establish the accuracy of the testimonies by accessing those 
who delivered them. What remains, in the absence of multi-modal sources, is the testi-
monies themselves and with such scrutiny as that proposed above by McGarry, the sol-
itary method by which they may be verified is through reading and analysis of the lan-
guage used within. Through the  utilisation of corpus tools and linguistic competencies 
a more thorough reading of the statements can provide a rigorous and well-informed 
assessment of the extent to which participants were committed to the truth of such state-
ments. 
1.3 3. The Corpus of Irish Historical Narratives (COIHN) 
In compiling a corpus from a large archive such as the BMH, certain criteria must be 
met to ensure that the corpus meets the needs of the study undertaken. As it was not 
deemed necessary to use the whole archive in order to get an impression of the linguistic 
characteristics of the archive, a sample of the archive was selected to provide an optimal 
representation of its entirety. To create a one-million-word corpus from the statements 
available in the BMH, which comprises over eleven-million words, many considerations 
were regarded to ensure that this sample was representative of the collection. Without 
such consideration, potential conclusions drawn during analysis may not be deemed typ-
ical of the collection as a whole. This required a three-staged corpus-design process. As 
regards representativeness, Leech (2007, p. 135) argues that, ‘Without representative-
ness, whatever is found to be true of a corpus, is simply true of that corpus – and cannot 
be extended to anything else.’ As this study does not analyse the entire archive, the sam-
ple that is taken from it must be designed to represent the entirety of the archive in order 
to make inferences about the full corpus. Thus, models of representativeness were ad-
hered to when undergoing corpus design. One aspect of determining the adequacy of a 
sample to represent the archive is the size that the corpus needs to be in order to suit the 
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purposes of this study, i.e to provide a sample large enough to investigate epistemic 
modality in the data. 
Vaughan and Clancy (2013) discuss the merits of using small, domain-specific cor-
pora for pragmatic research and contend that large corpora are unsuitable for some re-
search. This necessitates the return to the purpose of the study to ascertain the optimum 
amount of words to generate desired results. To this end, a certain amount of trial and 
error is necessary — conducted via the following stages. First, a corpus was constructed 
that provided a random sample of the archive, then, after a preliminary analysis and 
observation of meta-data, this was honed and reformulated into a corpus that was suita-
ble for the purposes of the study. After determining parameters related to corpus size, 
choices pertaining to text selection were made. As the initial stage of corpus construction 
did not involve any text selection criteria (the texts were selected randomly by choosing 
the first one-hundred statements listed alphabetically by surname), this was used to 
gauge how this approach did not represent the archive as a whole in terms of sociolin-
guistic factors; gender, location and age. This was compared with the dispersion of these 
factors in the archive as a whole and used to influence the reselection of texts based on 
these criteria. For example, 11% of the BMH archive is composed of testimonies deliv-
ered by female participants, and this must be reflected in COIHN. 
Further considerations when selecting texts included those outlined by Biber (1993), 
suggesting thought should be given to the kinds of texts included, the number of texts, 
the selection of particular texts and the length of text samples. In constructing COIHN, 
text length was deemed an important factor; as some statements originally included were 
in excess of 70,000 words, it was judged that too large a proportion of the corpus would 
be represented by some individuals, rather than the many potential voices; as Clancy 
(2010, p.85) states, ‘a relatively small corpus can be skewed by a relatively large text.’ 
Following the removal of a number of statements for these reasons, the size of the corpus 
was reduced significantly from 699,015 words to 275,010 words. Though the removal 
of statements for reasons related to length caused the most significant change in the 
corpus at this stage, there were other reasons for the exclusion of statements. By select-
ing statements by surname, there was a prevalence of participants from certain geo-
graphical regions. For example, the inclusion of all participants with the surname Barry 
resulted in six participants from Cork being included, where this surname is particularly 
common. 
In rebuilding the corpus, statements were chosen more selectively, paying attention 
to the geographical location of each participant. The resultant range of geographical lo-
cations is broad, at thirty-two, with stronger weight given to regions of higher population 
and dominance of participation in the events depicted in the statements. Finally, the cor-
pus was reconstructed to represent the archive with consideration given to the factors 
mentioned here. A summary of the three stages of the construction of COIHN is given 
in Table 1 below: 
 
Three stages of corpus construction 
Stage 0 0 0 
Description 0 0 0 
Number of statements 100 25 238 
Total words 699,02 275,01 0 
Average words per statement 6,54 11 4,2 
Table 1: Summary of three stages of corpus construction 
 81 
Fitzgerald (2020). Penetrating historical discourse’s truth matrix. DOI 10.18573/jcads.47 
Having constructed the corpus, COIHN was investigated to determine the density and 
type of items used which connote epistemic modality. A hybrid of corpus-based and 
corpus-driven approaches (Tognini-Bonelli, 2001) was taken as the items chosen for 
investigation were those which both emerged as salient in COIHN (through analysis of 
keyword lists) and those which were deemed pertinent to the aims of this study (such as 
those presented in the subsequent section). While this approach ceded some agency to 
the corpus itself in directing the research, much of the analytical direction remained in 
pursuit of predetermined aims and hypotheses regarding linguistic items that contribute 
to commitment to truth. The three items analysed in Section 5 below are presented to 
reflect the heteroglossic nature, diversity and complexity of expressions which establish 
epistemic modality. 
1.4 4. Epistemic modality 
Though hedging is not synonymous with epistemic modality, Coates (1982, p. 49) as-
serts the interrelationship between epistemic modality and hedging, stating that, ‘epis-
temic modality is always a hedge.’  Epistemic modality refers to a speaker’s degree of 
certainty to the truth of a proposition or, as Coates (1987, p. 112) describes it, ‘the 
speaker’s confidence or lack of confidence in the truth of the proposition expressed’. 
Epistemic modality, like hedging, is connected to the act of saving face (Fraser, 1990), 
in that the degree to which the truth of a proposition is committed to determines the level 
of risk incurred if the proposition is deemed false or unreliable (Vullioud et al., 2017). 
The risk, in this situation is to the perception of the speaker as reputable or reliable 
(Mazzarella et al., 2018). The salient features of COIHN that suggest a high degree of 
epistemic modality are first-person constructions of what Carter and McCarthy (2006, 
p. 734) term ‘mental process verbs’. Those analysed in this study are I think, I remember 
and I suppose. An extract from a BMH testimony is presented below to illustrate both 
the density and type of hedging present in the BMH testimonies, as well as to offer the 
reader an impression of the style of the testimonies. This extract is taken from the testi-
mony of Leslie de Barra (director of Cumann na mBan, the female Irish republican or-
ganisation) recollecting her experience of being present in the General Post-Office in 
Dublin in Easter week 1916. This sub-narrative follows a description of her general up-
bringing, which does not include such a density of hedges; when she moves towards a 
description of specific events along a set timeline, this prolific usage of hedges occurs. 
(For illustrative purposes, the mental process verbs mentioned above are italicized.) 
This was Monday and I suppose it was 2.30 -3p.m. when we got into the Post Office. I 
went over to the Hibernian Bank. I suppose it would have been about four or five 
o'clock in the evening when I went in. There was a girl named Annie Higgins there. She 
was afterwards burned to death some years afterwards in a Lance in Parnell Seward, 
Dublin I remember Bríd Connolly from Artane being there, but whether she stayed or 
not, I don't know. Others I remember were Miss Simpson, Christine O'Gorman, who 
was lame, and Miss Byrne. There were about four of us there and we were supposed to 
cook for the Volunteers. Cooked hams and bread were brought in from the D.B.C. and 
Clery's. Captain Weafer was in charge of the Hibernian Bank. He belonged to the 2nd 
Battalion. I remember Arthur Shields was in the Hibernian Bank. I did not know him at 
all but I remember, when Tom Weafer was shot, we all knelt down to say a prayer and 
Arthur Shields stood in a corner because he was not a Catholic. I think it was on the 
morning (afternoon?) of Wednesday that Tom Weafer got a bullet in his stomach. I 
remember then, when I suppose the death of Weafer was reported to the Post Office, 
that we were told to evacuate the Hibernian Bank. I would say it was Wednesday 
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afternoon when we evacuated. I remember being absolutely miserable at having to leave 
his dead body. I remember doing what I could for him and saying an Act of Contrition 
in his ear. (Statement of Leslie de Barra née Price; see Bureau of Military History [n.d.-
a], p. 8) 
Various devices are employed in the extract above to connote epistemic modality; ap-
proximations, vagueness to details highlighted with question marks, modal verbs and 
adverbs. All of these are worthy of analysis for their expression of commitment to truth 
(and are the subject of a forthcoming monograph), however, this study focuses on the 
aforementioned mental process verbs highlighted in bold. 
1.5 5. Analysis 
Holmes (1986, p. 13) proposes three categories to explain degrees of certainty and 
doubt; certain, probable and possible. Similarly, in her analysis of modal certainty, Si-
mon-Vandenbergen (1997, p.344) suggests degrees of commitment assigned to three 
values: 
1) neutral, expressing lack of commitment (median value) 
2) tentative, expressing weak commitment (low value) 
3) assertive, expressing strong commitment (high value) 
Concordance 1: Examples of I think in COIHN in combination with other hedged expressions 
Different levels of commitment in COIHN are exemplified in the concordance lines with 
I think as the node in the above in descending order of certainty. Halliday (1994) high-
lights the use of I think in proximity with modals to create a cumulative expression of 
uncertainty; while it must have been adds certainty in (1) I remember mitigates it in (2), 
further mitigation is achieved with I’m not sure in (3) and this is compounded with both 
as far as I remember and I’m not quite sure with I think in (4). 
Other studies use differing terminology to scale these values, but the use of three 
values is consistent, such as low, intermediate and high (Cornillie, 2007); strong, mod-
erate and weak (Nuyts, 2006). A blend of these terms is employed below to describe the 
use of mental process verbs in the BMH statements, starting with I think. 
5.1 I think 
Simon-Vandenbergen (2000) observes the difficulty in categorising the functionality of 
I think, indeed, the numerous categorisations of the functions of I think tend to suggest 
conflicting uses. Both Fetzer (2014) and O’Grady (2017) analyse the use of I think in 
political contexts; O’Grady’s (2017, p.297) focus on political debates found four func-
tions of I think in initial position: 
1) projecting a speaker’s commitment to a proposition by allowing him to seem 
confident and assured 
2) uncertainty or tentativeness 
3) evaluation of a proposition (when used in proximity of a modal verb) 
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4) as a hesitation device (when used with pauses or hesitation markers). 
The first two functions here highlight the conflicting and somewhat contradictory nature 
of the use of I think and the difficulty that this poses in categorising its function with 
certainty as it expresses both assuredness and uncertainty. Elsewhere, I think has been 
described as expressing both certainty by increasing authority and objectivity as well as 
uncertainty by connoting tentativeness (Preisler 1986, Holmes 1990, Aijmer 1997). 
Brown and Levinson (1987, p. 171) state that, by using I think a speaker is, ‘not taking 
full responsibility for the truth of his utterance.’ While Holmes (1990) suggests that I 
think boosts assertion, Kaltenböck (2007, p. 239) states that it is deliberative ‘only in 
initial positions if it has a nuclear tone or prosodic booster or if it is followed by a that-
complementiser.’ In Kaltenböck’s (2010) investigation of the hedging properties of I 
think, he asserts that the effect of such a term on the listener is most often that the listener 
assumes this connotes that the statement is an approximation of the truth and that the 
user is attempting to produce a statement that is as close to the truth as they can attempt 
to be despite limitations of memory or knowledge. The data here also suggests expres-
sions with remember have a similar effect (see Section 5.2). 
Zhang’s (2011, 2014) ‘elasticity framework’ proposes a scale of functions of I think 
that are stretchable and can overlap. The five functions as presented in Zhang (2014, p. 
228) are shown below and incorporate the functionality that is articulated in much of the 
previously stated literature: 
 
Emphatic  Evaluative  Mitigating  Tentative  Discursive 
Figure 2: Five functions of Zhang’s (2011, 2014) elasticity framework 
These malleable categories, according to Zhang, work in order of descending strength 
and I think is chosen by a speaker due to the fluidity of these categories; it is precisely 
this malleability which makes I think a preferred expression due to its multiple applica-
tions and the awareness that a reader/listener may attribute any of these to its use. Con-
cordance 1 (above) shows how these categories manifest in the data when I think is used 
in combination with other hedged expressions. 
I think occurs 579 times in COIHN and predominantly functions as an epistemic 
modal expression rather than as a marker of opinion, which accounts for the majority of 
its 1,975 occurrences in the spoken, Limerick Corpus of Irish English, (also a 1-million 
word and used as the key comparative corpus for this study [see Farr, Murphy and 
O’Keeffe, 2004]). The distinction between opinion I think and epistemic modal I think 
is made by determining whether it is used to express a positive/negative judgement for 
the former or degree of certainty to determine it as the latter. The below samples show 
its usage in expressing tentativeness towards detail in initial position: 
(1) I think that would be the beginning of May 1921 but it was before O'Malley came to visit us. 
(2) I think it was on the morning (afternoon?) of Wednesday that Tom Weafer got a bullet in his 
(3) I think I am very vague about this that I had a short interview with him; but before I took up 
(4) I think Dermot O'Hegarty was there. Leo Henderson was there, also Liam Carroll. I distinctly 
The last of these, (4), suggests a distinguishing between levels of commitment; while 
doubt is expressed in the first sentence, this is contrasted with the second that suggests 
a higher degree of certainty when devoid of I think. As with I suppose (see Section 5.3 
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below), I think also has properties which are used for framing evaluations of the thoughts 
or feeling of others, as in example (5): 
(5) I think she was taken aback by my attitude and by the fact that I had not realised it earlier 
As with the other mental process verbs outlined here, I think, when used in proximity 
with other items that connote epistemic modality such as modals (6, 7), which suggest a 
degree of propositional evaluation aligning with O’Grady’s framework above, or with 
approximators (8, 9) or with a combination of these (10), create a cumulative effect of 
tentativeness: 
(6) I think it must have been Holy Saturday afternoon that my brother-in-law, Joe Connolly, went 
(7) I think I must have been given a cast-off. There was an electric shot firer to be got at the mines 
(8) I think that was about one week later after our trial we were brought back to Kilmainham Jail 
(9) I think that approximately two to four men from each Company were selected to form it. I was 
(10) I think it must have been about May 1921, we went down to Fidown in the 8th Battalion area 
Álvarez-Gil and Alonso (2019) describe the relationship between modality and eviden-
tiality expressed by I think. They define evidentiality as ‘the set of linguistic mechanisms 
involved in expressing the source of information from which the speaker has obtained 
the information to formulate the specific propositional content he or she expresses, as 
well as the way in which the information has been attained (p. 48)’. Therefore, while 
evidentiality is an expression related to the source of knowledge, epistemic modality is 
related to commitment to the reliability of that source (de Haan, 2005). 
Evidentiality can inform expressions of epistemic modality as it is concerned with 
providing the source from which a proposition may be judged as true and so is often 
dealt with as a sub-category of epistemic modality. Álvarez-Gil and Alonso describe 
these dual characteristics of I think and found that evidential I think is used as a polite-
ness strategy reducing the risk of face-threatening results, while epistemic I think is used 
to preserve the positive face of the writer.   
It is somewhat difficult to categorise with confidence the occurrences of I think that 
suggest evidence or epistemic modality. As has been previously stated, the literature on 
each show that these categories are not always mutually exclusive. However, Diewald 
et al. (2009, p. 190) propose that evidentiality should be treated externally to epistemic 
modality, ‘Evidentiality is concerned with indicating the information source the speaker 
is relying on to make a claim. This places this category next to epistemic modality with-
out, however, merging them into one.’ This intersective stance is one which corresponds 
with the perspective of this study in relation to the treatment of I think as, unlike the 
other two mental process verbs analysed here, I think is used to express a tentativeness 
towards the truth of the proposition while also attributing the source of that knowledge 
to the self. Influencing the judgement of the credibility of that source is the memory and 
subjective experience of the participant. I think is employed in the data, just as those 
devices explicitly expressing fallibility of memory (see Section 5.2 below) to express 
the modality of evidence. This infers a merging of evidential and epistemic modality in 
I think to establish a concurrent multi-functionality. In keeping with that expressed by 
Nuyts (2001), I think is used as a subjective expression of evidence i.e. the knowledge 
available to the self is the evidence that informs the narrative. The awareness of the 
participant as to the degree to which this is reliable helps them decide the degree of 
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epistemic modality to employ to maximally save their face. Thus, three functions of I 
think emerge, which may be employed independently or concurrently: 
1) designation of the self as the source of knowledge – subjective evidential 
2) acknowledgement of the fallibility of that knowledge – epistemic modal 
3) reduction of face-threatening risk – politeness 
In relation to the second of these, Lyons (1977) distinguishes between objective epis-
temic modality, which expresses an objectively measurable chance that a proposition is 
true or not and subjective epistemic modality, which involves a purely subjective guess 
regarding its truth. Others such as Coates (1983) and Palmer (2001) imply an inherent 
subjectivity in epistemic modality, while Nuyts (2001) proposes a framework of inter-
subjectivity in epistemic modality as it involves the perspectives of both the speaker and 
the hearer. 
In addition to the above explication, it should be noted that I think, as an almost 
universally applicable truth predicate, reflects that anything can be perceived as true or 
untrue because this indicates both the source of knowledge as thought and a degree of 
tentativeness towards that knowledge as being the truth. This holds that I think can be 
employed as a device from which the ‘equal validity paradox’ emerges in discourses of 
not only taste and opinion as suggested by Coliva and Moruzzi (2014), but also in dis-
courses of personal experience where the speaker is not only the producer of an utter-
ance, but also the source of evidence informing it. Even though two statements may 
provide contrary content about the same event, when the participants use I think they 
enter into a domain of ‘faultless disagreement’ where both statements may be deemed 
equally valid (Kölbel, 1997). If the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) states that both 
sides of contradiction cannot be true (Grim, 2004), then to accept the nature of I think 
as a self-justifying truth predicate that cannot be disputed, the pursuit of a dialethic per-
spective that takes into account paraconsistent logic where statements can be deemed 
both true and untrue is necessary. Though the extracts which exemplify uses of I think 
in this section are not what Coliva and Moruzzi (p. 38) describe as, ‘disputes about what 
is tasty, beautiful and morally right’, these are nonetheless similarly faultless as they are 
declarations of the self as the sole source of evidence to substantiate the truth of the 
events described and so can not be contradicted by an audience who does not have access 
to this intangible source. 
5.2 I remember 
‘The passing of forty years has dimmed the memory of the events of those history-
making days of 1915 and reminiscences of the true facts are somewhat vague.’ 
(Testimony of Thomas Dwyer (statement 1198); see Bureau of Military History [n.d.-b], 
p. 2) 
The above extract highlights the keen sense of the influence of memory felt by some of 
the participants of the BMH and the impact of this on their ability to commit fully to the 
truth of their statements. Though not always stated as explicitly as this, memory is des-
ignated throughout the statements as a source of tentativeness to commitment through 
various expressions. Figure 3 below presents the allocation of the 1,113 occurrences of 
I remember into strong, weak or moderate memory categories, in accordance with the 
framework proposed by Nuyts (2005) above, through observation of its usage in context. 
These include occurrences where the pronoun and verb are separated, for example, I 
well remember and I can not remember. 
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As can be seen from Figure 3, while occurrences of expressions of strong memory 
are frequent, participants are more likely to express hyperthymesia, which tallies with 
Achugar’s (2008) analysis of the construction of memory in military discourse. In a de-
parture from the stylistic norm of the statements, I remember often collocates with now 
to perform a degree of metalepsis. Often used in literary criticism, metalepsis is what 
Genette (1988, p. 234) describes in a somewhat literary fashion as, ‘a boundary that is 
precisely the narrating (or performance) itself: a shifting but sacred frontier between two 
worlds, the world which one tells, the world of which one tells.’ Metalepsis is, for the 
most part, absent throughout the statements (as evidenced by a lack of present simple 
constructions), yet in expressions of memory, participants are inclined to use now. This 
divergence from the relative conformity of the dominant tense (past simple) to frame 
these expressions into ‘the world which one tells’ shows a particular proclivity on the 
part of the participants to express their degree of memory despite the departure from the 
stylistic norms of the statements inherent in doing so. This necessitates further observa-
tion then as to the motives of the participants’ willingness to part from the rhetorical 
norms of the statement to express the degree to which their recollection is reliable. These 
expressions perform more than just the standard functions of hedges but point towards 
a manifestation of a discursive construction of truth. Not all statements contain an abun-
dance of these expressions, some statements are far more direct in their recounting of 










Figure 3: Total number of occurrences of remember to express degrees of memory 
The cognitive acts of thinking and remembering are referred to as spontaneously trig-
gered sources during the act of delivering the testimony: 
(11) assembled at Walterstown. As far as I can remember now, there were about fourteen or 
(12) ere of the times pointed that way. I cannot remember now who made the remarks that by 
(13) enses. Amongst the members whom I can remember now were Christopher Lynam, Jas 
The cognitive process of remembering while engaged in delivering the testimony is ex-
emplified in the above and further illustrated with broader context in the extract below 
with both thought and memory emerging as influential processes: 
(14) Thinking about this now, it may have been before O'Malley's arrest that Treacy was arrested, 
because I remember that Treacy was the officer commanding the Brigade during the attack on 
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Hugginstown R.I.C. Barracks which took place in March 1920, and I think that was the last action 
he took part in before his arrest. 
The act or performance of the testimony brings the participant to the point of accessing 
knowledge that had been dormant and participants, as seen in the above extract, are 
willing to express this flow of emerging knowledge. This also provides evidence of the 
episodic memory that is prevalent in the articulation of the accounts as opposed to 
merely event memory or semantic memory (Keven, 2016). Mirativity essentially de-
scribes the expectation of knowledge in discourse (Hyslop, 2017). Though Aikhenvald 
(2012) mainly deals with mirative strategies as prevalent features of languages other 
than English, she highlights an aspect of mirativity as being the ‘unprepared mind’ which 
appears to influence the expressions of spontaneous recollection exemplified in the 
above samples. 
5.3 I suppose 
Moreton (2016, p.330) highlights the emotional significance of I suppose in Irish fam-
ine-era emigrant letters, showing that it both adds to the interactive nature of the letters 
and influences the construction of an imagined world from shared knowledge of family 
and friends. This emotional weight of I suppose is less present in the BMH documents 
due to their monologic nature directed towards an ‘imagined audience’ (Goffman, 1974), 
rather than the close personal relationship between the author and recipient of the letters 
under analysis by Moreton and others (see Hickey and Amador-Moreno 2020). Of the 
38 occurrences of I suppose in COIHN, 30 of these collocate with approximators or it is 
used as a discourse connecting hedge (Fetzer, 2010). The remainder, as in the examples 
below, suggest the usage of I suppose in situations where the thoughts, feelings or 
knowledge of others are being reported. While still acting as a hedge, this shows a ten-
tativeness towards committing to what is essentially vicarious and unverifiable (Pillemer 
et al., 2015). 
(15) I suppose, from the military point of view, he knew the G.P.O. was practically surrounded an 
(16) I suppose he knew the trend of thought and feeling among the staff of his school and wondere 
(17) I suppose he felt he was as near to death as ever he wanted to be. We were cursing Tobin and 
(18) I suppose he thought that, as I had been so successful in organising the Gaelic League, I woul 
(19) I suppose he was afraid of reprisals. It was a puzzle what to do with this officer. He was one 
I suppose is used in the above, collocating with what Goffman (1967) terms ‘connec-
tives’. Connectives, according to Goffman, are used to frame reported speech in phrases 
such as he said that and according to. Such connectives are seen to hold particular 
weight in terms of attribution of social responsibility (Goodwin, 1990) in both written 
and spoken discourse (Rae and Kerby, 2007). The connectives in the examples shown 
here are referring to thought, experience or knowledge of others and so tally with these 
phenomena; he knew, he thought, he felt, he was afraid. In accordance with Goffman’s 
participation framework, the person whose thoughts are being accounted for aligns with 
a principal, though they are not shown to be responsible for the talk as the principal role 
suggests, they are shown to be responsible for the thought, showing an articulation of 
the presumed stance of the principal rather than the author. There is an element of exter-
nal evaluation (Labov, 1972) that is more commonly associated with quotations in these 
examples, where the main narrative thread is somewhat distanced in order to evaluate 
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the thoughts of others. In framing these propositions with I suppose the participants are 
showing an awareness of what Schiffrin (1993, p. 233) describes as the, ‘speak for your-
self rule’. This rule implies that, to speak for another, there are certain devices which 
need to be employed to, ‘show displacement in person, space and time’. As with I think, 
I suppose reflects a consciousness of the fallibility of the self as the evidence of the 
thoughts or feelings of another and a conscientious willingness to express this. An added 
weight to this in the current data may be the effect of knowing that these expressions are 
attributing knowledge or feelings to those who were killed in the events depicted or not 
given the opportunity to contribute their own version of events to public record and so 
commitment to this attribution as fact is mitigated through the usage of I suppose. 
1.6 6. Conclusion 
In summation, it is worth discussing the collective effect of the three mental process 
verbs presented above. It has been outlined that I think expresses epistemic modality 
with evidential properties, I remember aligns with the notion of mirativity, while I sup-
pose is used with connectives to framing reported thought (Britt 2018), feeling or expe-
rience. A liberal usage of such verbs, in accordance with the literature on hedging might 
initially assume the effect of mitigating the authority of the witness as reliable presenters 
of historical events. Paradoxically, the effect on the overall impression of the witness 
who is willing to express a conscientious appraisal of their own knowledge results in a 
heightened integrity and an increased impression of reliability. This paradoxical author-
ity is achieved through a presentation of self that is both self-aware and aware of the 
broader context to which their testimony contributes, boosting, rather than reducing their 
authoritativeness of their accounts. 
This study has presented the multi-dimensional matrix of historical discourse and 
shown how three mental process verbs connoting epistemic modality in testimonies of 
witnesses to historical events contribute to the linguistic construction of truth in sources 
of historical significance. Other devices such as fillers, modal verbs, reported speech 
and passive voice have epistemic modality properties and are worthy of future analysis. 
In addition, the assessment of context is central to the interpretation of truth, ‘[t]he dis-
course of truth is determined by the historical context in which it is also interpreted. This 
context seems to play a major role in what can be named as the verification of truth’ 
(Deligiaouri 2018, p. 305). An awareness then of the environment in which a text is not 
only created, but in which it is presented influences its factual integrity. 
In terms of the current study, this involves multiple contexts with a seemingly inex-
orable extension; the context of the event, the context of the depiction of the event, the 
context of the construction of this depiction, the context of the presentation of this con-
structed depiction, the context of the representation of this in historical adaptations, the 
context of the representations in which these adaptations are referenced — ad infinitum. 
This study has shown that the analysis of mental process verbs, in conjunction with an 
awareness of both the context they emerge from and are subsequently utilised can pro-
vide a clearer lens through which historical sources may be judged. Rather than looking 
at the words of history or historical writing (Mazzi, 2014), this study analysed the words 
that compose the sources of history which subsequently inform historical writing. This 
has shown that a corpus-assisted (Partington, 2006) framework, when used in combina-
tion with established historical methods, may add depth to historical research that in-
volves oral history texts, establishing it as a ‘curative science’ rather than a ‘handmaiden 
of philosophy’ as suggested by Foucault (in Bouchard and Simon 1977, p. 156). While 
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historians engage with texts at a level that is conducive to their discipline’s understand-
ing of what is necessary to extract what is needed as sources to inform historical narra-
tives, this engagement likewise pertains to the knowledge of a data-set required to fulfil 
a corpus-assisted approach (Partington et al., 2013) to textual analysis that is counter to 
the distanced observation of data-sets in solely corpus analytical frameworks (Sinclair, 
2004). Though the complex layers of the multi-dimensional truth matrix remain impen-
etrable in totality, this study has offered evidence that linguistic tools and competencies 
can redress the lack of reciprocity between linguists and historians alluded to by 
Schiffrin (2003), and offer substance to the assessment of the integrity of sources prior 
to their subsequent dissemination. 
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